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A B S T R A C T
Earthquakes are natural disasters which human beings cannot control, causing signiﬁcant damage to the
economy and society as a whole. In particular, earthquakes aﬀect not only buildings but also lifeline structures
such as water distribution, electric power, transportation, and telecommunication networks. The interruption of
these networks is critical because it can directly damage the facilities and, at the same time, cause long-term loss
of the overall system for society. In recent years, there has been increasing interest in the uncertainties of ground
motion, deterioration of pipelines, and interdependency of lifelines. Therefore, it is essential to predict the
damage through possible earthquake scenarios and accounting for factors aﬀecting lifeline structures. This study
proposes a comprehensive framework to quantify the impact of earthquakes on the connectivity of urban water
transmissions. The framework proposes the following steps to predict damage from earthquakes: (1) estimate the
ground motion considering the spatial correlation, (2) propose a modiﬁed failure probability of buried pipelines
considering deterioration, and (3) evaluate the seismic fragility curves of network components and the inter-
dependency among water treatment plants, pumping plants, and substations. For numerical simulations, an
actual water network system in South Korea was constructed using graph theory, and the magnitudes and lo-
cations of the epicenters were determined based on historical earthquake data. Finally, the reliability perfor-
mance indicators (e.g., connectivity loss and serviceability ratio) were measured when earthquakes of various
magnitudes occurred in the urban area. This framework will enable the prediction of damage from earthquakes
and enhance decision making to minimize the extent of damage.
1. Introduction
Signiﬁcant natural disasters such as earthquakes, landslides,
droughts, ﬂoods, and hurricanes have occurred in recent times, causing
social disruption and economic losses [1,2]. In particular, natural dis-
asters may have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on complex lifeline systems
because social infrastructures in urban areas are highly concentrated. In
addition, as the bulk of lifeline facilities are installed underground, it is
diﬃcult to recognize and repair the damage, which can lead to a long-
term supply stagnation. Recent disasters have highlighted the need to
predict damage to lifeline facilities and establish disaster recovery
strategies for repairs.
The Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) [3] analyzed the
extent of damage to water distribution networks from natural disasters.
Although the damage to the water facilities varied depending on the
frequency and intensity of the occurrences, it was reported that
earthquakes have signiﬁcant inﬂuence on water network systems.
Earthquakes cause the overall destruction of signiﬁcant areas of system
which results in loss of both life and property, and even more serious
secondary damage, including ﬁres following the earthquake, and gas
leakages [4]. The probability of a strong earthquake is remote, but once
it occurs, the functionality of water network systems could deteriorate.
Therefore, it is essential for the earthquake engineering community to
conduct a risk assessment of water transmission networks.
The Northridge earthquake in California (1994) and the Kobe
earthquake in Japan (1995) caused signiﬁcant damage to water dis-
tribution networks [5]. The Northridge earthquake resulted in 74 in-
stances of damage to main water pipes with diameters greater 600mm,
and 1013 to main water pipes with diameters smaller than 600mm [6].
In the case of the Kobe earthquake, 23 instances of damage occurred in
main water pipes, resulting in disruption of drinking water supplies to
approximately 15 million people. In 2016 earthquakes in New Zealand
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resulted in a number of problems in critical lifeline structures, that led
to both direct and indirect economic losses as residential, commercial,
and industrial activities were interrupted. This was a result of the in-
terdependency of lifeline facilities (e.g., water distribution, electric
power, transportation, and telecommunication) having an indirect ef-
fect on other lifelines (indirect loss) as well as damage to the lifeline
itself (direct loss). Therefore, if earthquake damage is not repaired
timeously, it could cause not only great discomfort in the lives of local
residents, but also signiﬁcant economic losses.
Various studies have been conducted to predict seismic hazard as-
sessment of infrastructure based on topology-based connectivity. For
example, Nuti et al. [7,8] proposed a methodology for seismic safety
analysis of electric power, water distribution, and road networks, and
they also conducted a seismic evaluation of electric power network at
urban level [9]. Esposito et al. [10] worked on the seismic risk as-
sessment of gas distribution networks including the fragility curves of
system components, such as metering/pressure reduction stations. Ro-
kneddin et al. [11] presented a ﬁnite-state Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) simulation to evaluate the reliability of ageing highway bridge
networks, and proposed a bridge retroﬁt priority and ranking strategy
based on transportation network topology. Ching and Hsu [12] ana-
lyzed seismic reliability of actual lifeline networks using Origin-Desti-
nation connectivity (O-D connectivity) reliability. With regard to water
distribution networks, Yoo et al. [5] proposed a model to conduct the
seismic hazard assessment of J-city and I-city in South Korea con-
sidering water network facilities such as water storage tanks and water
pumping plants. Fragiadakis and Christodoulou [13], and Fragiadakis
et al. [14] conducted a seismic reliability assessment of the Limassol
water supply network in Cyprus by introducing the modiﬁed repair
rates equation to account for the degradation of distribution pipelines.
Moreover, Christodoulou et al. [15] proposed a methodology for as-
sessment of Water Distribution Network (WDN) system based on net-
work topology and component analysis. Osorio et al. [16] evaluated the
seismic response of critical interdependent networks between water
distribution and electric power networks, and proposed a recovery
strategy to mitigate damage. In addition, Poljanšek et al. [17] presented
a model to consider the interdependence of gas and electric power
networks and conducted research on power losses in Europe according
to the coupling strength. Regarding the non-simulation-based algo-
rithm, Lee et al. [18] evaluated the post-hazard ﬂow capacity of a road
network considering the deterioration of bridges in Sioux Falls, USA, by
means of a non-sampling-based matrix-based system reliability (MSR)
method [19,20]. Song and Ok [21] proposed a multi-scale system re-
liability method to evaluate gas distribution networks in Shelby County,
Tennessee, USA, using the MSR method as well. In addition, Lim and
Song [22] proposed a selective recursive decomposition algorithm to
evaluate risk assessment of water networks subjected to spatially cor-
related ground motions.
Previous studies have suggested an eﬀective way to predict and
assess damage from earthquakes. However, even if such analytical
methods were developed, only limited studies have combined all the
analytical methods. For example, Fragiadakis and Christodoulou [13]
studied seismic reliability assessment considering the fragility of water
treatment plants, water storage tanks, and pumping plants, but ex-
cluded water transmission network systems. Yoo et al. [5] excluded the
interdependency of lifeline facilities and the spatially correlated ground
motion prediction equation (GMPE) in their study. In other studies
numerical simulations considering deterioration of pipelines were not
conducted. To overcome the limitations of previous studies, this study
proposes a comprehensive framework that incorporates the spatially
correlated ground motion, deterioration of pipelines, and inter-
dependency of water and electric power networks, as well as the fra-
gility of water treatment plants, water storage tanks, and pumping
plants. An actual water transmission network in A-city, South Korea,
was used as the target region for applying the comprehensive frame-
work, as A-city is subjected to frequent earthquakes.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the
theoretical background of the comprehensive framework including
network analysis, prediction of ground motion, damage to deteriorated
pipelines, fragility curves of other facilities, and interdependency be-
tween water and electric power networks. In Section 3, we propose a
comprehensive framework for seismic risk assessment of urban water
networks. Section 4 describes an actual water transmission network in
A-city in South Korea, and presents the results of the seismic risk ana-
lysis in accordance with earthquake magnitude, elapsed time, and in-
terdependency. Finally, Section 5 concludes this study and recommends
future study directions to add to and improve on this study.
2. Theoretical background
2.1. Network analysis
2.1.1. Graph theory
Graph theory is a powerful mathematical tool for easy control of
complex network data. The graph theory comprises nodes (junctions)
and edges (links), denoted by V and E, respectively, and can be ex-
pressed as G= (E, A). The graphs are divided into directed and un-
directed graphs according to whether the direction between the initial
node (v1) and end node (v2) is unidirectional or bidirectional, and a
mixed graph exists when two graphs coexist together. The connectivity
of the graph represents the topological structure of the network, and the
entire network is represented by an N×N adjacency matrix A, where N
is the total number of nodes in the network. The component of the
adjacency matrix A is Aij = 1 if the connection between nodes i and j is
possible, otherwise 0. Using graph theory, it is possible to identify the
shortest path and connectivity between sources and the sink node. In
addition, it can be eﬀectively used in a large network because it can
easily reﬂect the destruction of links resulting from external dis-
turbances such as earthquakes. Fig. 1 shows an example of a simple
network and adjacency matrix.
2.1.2. Performance indicator
Once the failure probabilities of all water network facilities are
known, the performance of the entire network can be evaluated.
Various approaches for evaluating network performance can be uti-
lized, depending on requirements of the user (i.e., connectivity and ﬂow
reliability). A proper indicator must be determined to enable accurate
performance measurement, as it depends on network size, type, and
topology of the graph. Therefore, it is important to deﬁne a failure
status of the network by setting parameters that have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the network. As a simple example, success and failure can be cate-
gorized depending on whether or not the water from the source node
can reach the sink node. In addition, it is also possible to evaluate the
importance of each storage tank (sink) considering the number of in-
habitants supplied from the water treatment plant (source). Once the
quantiﬁed network assessment methods are determined, the perfor-
mance indicators can be evaluated accurately.
In this study, two performance indicators, connectivity loss (CL) and
serviceability ratio (SR), were used to evaluate the network perfor-
mance from source to sink. Both indices are vulnerability analysis based
on connectivity. Typically, two quantiﬁed indicators can be classiﬁed
into minor, moderate, and major damage states according to
Fig. 1. Example of simple network and adjacency matrix.
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performance of 20%, 50%, and 80%, respectively, and it is possible to
evaluate the status of systematic network. From quantiﬁed indicators, it
is possible to evaluate the performance of waterworks and this is easily
adapted to other lifeline structures.
The CL is the connectivity index between the source node i and the
sink node j which is expressed as the ratio of connectivity before and
after earthquake. The deﬁnition of CL is shown in the following equa-
tion, which is similar to the equation Poljansek et al. presented in 2011
[17].
CL
N
N
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,
,
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where Ni Damaged, is the number of sink nodes connected to source node i
after an earthquake, Ni Intact, is the number of sink nodes connected to
source node i in the intact network, and the operator • i represents the
average value of connectivity ratio of all source nodes i.
The SR measures the number of transmission nodes accessible from
the source node. The deﬁnition of SR can be deﬁned by the following
equation, which is similar to the equation Adachi and Ellingwood
proposed in 2008 [23]. The proposed SR equation considers all dis-
tribution nodes, but, as there is no ﬂow rate in the transmission pipe,
the SR is calculated using only the sink node.
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where wj is the total water demand from the source, Ns is the number of
storage tanks, and Xi j, is the probability of success of the water supply
from the source to the sink from the Bernoulli trial. If the source node i
and sink node j are connected, Xi j, =1 otherwise, Xi j, =0.
2.2. Spatially correlated seismic attenuation law
2.2.1. Ground motion prediction equation
The ground motion is the process of energy radiating from the
source to the ground surface during the rupture. Various ground mo-
tions can be generated according to the seismic propagation and geo-
logical characteristics. Traditionally, the ground motion is predicted by
a probability distribution of seismic intensity measure (IM) which is
conditionally selected considering variables such as seismic source,
seismic propagations path, and local site environments [24]. For con-
sidering complex physical phenomenon, a GMPE was proposed by
simple mathematical expressions [25–27]. The representative para-
meters for describing a GMPE are magnitude of the earthquake, the
distance from the source to the site, fault type, and site class of ground
[24]. The typical ground motion is given as [28–30]:
LogY T LogY M R λ T η T T( ) ( , , , )̅ ( ) ϵ ( )ij n ij j ij ij n j n ij n= + + (3)
where Y T( )ij n is the ground motion parameter at the i-th site because of
the j-th seismic event with vibration period Tn, Mj is the magnitude of
the j-th earthquake, Rij is the distance between the source and site, λij is
other factors that inﬂuence the ground motion, and Y ̅ij describes the
median value of the ground motion. The last two terms of ηj and ϵij
indicate the inter- and intra-events, respectively, which represent the
uncertainty of the ground motion. These two parameters are in-
dependent from each other and follow the normal distribution with a
zero mean (μ μ,η ϵ =0) and standard deviation (σ σ, )η ϵ . The two terms
are described in detail in Section 2.2.2.
As GMPE is characterized by propagation paths and local site con-
ditions, therefore, an appropriate GMPE should be adopted for speciﬁc
studied areas. It has been widely reported in the literature that buried
pipelines exhibit vulnerability to the peak ground velocity (PGV), and
other facilities such as water treatment plants, and pump stations are
vulnerable to the peak ground acceleration (PGA). In this study, the
GMPE for PGV proposed by Wang and Takada [31] and the PGA pro-
posed by Kawashima et al. [32] were utilized to consider the seismic
wave propagation in a water distribution network. The two equations
are as follows:
Log PGV M H log R e( ) 0.725 0.00318 0.519 1.318 ( 0.334 )M0.653= + − − +
(4)
PGA R403.8 x 10 x( 30)M0.265 1.218= + − (5)
where M is magnitude of the earthquake, H is the focal depth (km), and
R is epicentral distance (km).
2.2.2. Spatial correlation
The GMPE proposed in Section 2.2.1 is able to calculate the median
value of the ground motion. However, as the GMPE parameters have an
uncertainty, it is essential to accurately predict the ground motion
considering the residual terms. The residual terms of the GMPE can be
expressed as inter-event (between earthquakes) and intra-event (within
the earthquake) residuals [27]. The inter-event indicates that the re-
leased energy can be varied during the rupture even if the diﬀerent
seismic waves are propagated in the same path. The intra-event in-
dicates that the propagated energy can be varied because of diﬀerent
seismic wave paths and geotechnical environments [33]. Therefore,
inter-event residuals generate constant spatial values (overall increase
or decrease), while intra-event residuals have spatially correlated
ground motions depending on the propagated paths.
There are numerous spatial correlation models with respect to
seismic regions, including for California [30], Europe [34,35], Taiwan
[31,36], and Japan [31,37,38]. As the spatial correlation is derived
according to the geotechnical characteristics, an appropriate correla-
tion model should be adopted for speciﬁc studied areas. In this study,
the intra-event correlation equation proposed by Goda and Hong [30]
was used for considering the spatially correlated ground motion, as the
seismic design code of a buried pipeline in South Korea was released
based on the Californian regions. An equation for considering the total
correlation can be expressed as [36]:
ρ
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where
ρ Δ e( )ij ( 0.509 )= − ∆ (7)
is the intra-event correlation function, Δij is distance between the i-th
site and the j-th site, and ση and σϵ are the inter- and intra-event re-
siduals, respectively, which are predeﬁned terms.
2.3. Seismic vulnerability analysis of networks
2.3.1. Deterioration of water pipelines
The US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and
American Lifelines Alliance (ALA) presented the failure probability of
buried pipelines [39,40]. According to the report, the bulk of historical
earthquake records show the failure probability of buried pipes based
on the repair rate (number of breaks per unit length). The repair rate is
calculated based on the regression curve, which represents the number
of pipe breaks due to ground motion. Typically, PGV and peak ground
deformation (PGD) are known as the representative IM that aﬀects pi-
peline damage. The PGV represents a strong ground motion by seismic
wave propagation, whereas the PGD represents the eﬀect on landslides,
liquefaction, ground settlement, and fault crossing [13]. In this study,
the eﬀect of ground motion was investigated by selecting the PGV as the
IM. In the HAZUS-MH manual, the repair rate of the i-th brittle pipeline
(cast iron, concrete, and cement pipes) is calculated by the following
formula:
RR breaks km κ PGV( / ) ( )i i τ= (8)
where PGVi is ground motion of midpoint of the i-th pipeline, and κ τand
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are the scaling and exponent parameters, respectively. For ductile pi-
pelines (steel and ductile iron), the average repair rate is reduced by
30% compared to brittle pipelines. By substituting the calculated repair
rate into the fragility model, the failure probability of the i-th buried
pipe can be obtained as follows:
P e1f i RR L, i i= − − (9)
where RRi and Li are the repair rate and length of the i-th pipeline,
respectively. Depending on the extent of damage, the failure probability
of pipelines can be classiﬁed as either complete damage or leakage
damage that could lead to water supply disruption. According to
technical reports, 15–20% of the failures are total break damage, while
80–85% are reported as leakage damage [41]. Some researchers con-
ducted seismic fragility curve analysis of gas and liquid pipeline with
respect to diﬀerent damage states and risk states [42–44]. However,
since the seismic hazard assessment is conducted based on connectivity
analysis (break or not) in this study, the repair rate proposed by FEMA
was utilized.
As the proposed fragility model follows the Poisson process, past
events have memoryless properties that do not aﬀect the present.
Therefore, the probability of pipeline failure is determined only by IM,
and the aging eﬀect from structural deterioration is not taken into ac-
count. In this study, the survival function was utilized to consider the
deterioration of buried pipelines. Survival analysis is a method of pre-
dicting the expected or residual lifetimes of a structure based on past
data [45,46]. The shape of the survival function is shown to be de-
pendent on a number of factors, including the number of previous
breaks (NOPB), material type, incident type, and diameter range
[47,48]. Fragiadakis and Christodoulou [13] conducted seismic relia-
bility assessments using the NOPB-based survival analysis of the Li-
massol water supply network in Cyprus. They proposed a modiﬁed
repair rate equation by considering the ratio of intact and damaged
survival functions. The modiﬁed repair rate and failure probability can
be expressed as:
RR
S t
S t
RR̅
( )
( )
xi
Intact pipe
Damaged
i=
(10)
where RR̅i is the modiﬁed repair rate of the i-th pipeline, S t( )Intact pipe
and S t( )Damaged are survival functions of intact (NOPB = 0) and da-
maged pipelines (NOPB ≠ 0), respectively, and t is the elapsed time
since being buried. By substituting the calculated modiﬁed repair rate
into Eq. (9), the modiﬁed failure fragility model is deﬁned as follows:
P e̅ 1f i RR L, ̅ i i= − − (11)
where P ̅f i, is the modiﬁed failure probability and repair rate of the i-th
pipeline.
However, the survival function proposed by Fragiadakis and
Christodoulou [13] is not appropriate for water transmission network
due to diﬀerent characteristics of pipelines (diﬀerent diameters and
materials). Therefore, this study utilized the survival function of the
water transmission network which was proposed by Park et al. [49]. In
their study, NOPB is not considered as a parameter of the survival
function, and they assumed that all pipes deteriorate equally over time
(NOPB≠ 0), which means that S t( )Intact pipe is always deﬁned as 1, while
S t( )Damaged decreases over time depending on the pipeline properties.
The parameters of the survival function, comprising pipe diameter,
length, age, and material (steel or cast iron) of the South Korea trans-
mission pipes, are suitable for this case study. Fig. 2 shows the survival
function of 600mm diameter and 500m long cast iron and steel pipes.
The survival probability of the cast iron pipeline decreased rapidly after
25–30 years of use, and the steel pipes did not signiﬁcantly deteriorate
even after 30 years of use. The results indicate that steel pipes have a
greater survival probability than cast iron pipes that is in agreement
with statistics from waterworks (see Fig. 2).
The survival function proposed by Park et al. [49] was used to
estimate the modiﬁed repair rate RR̅i and the modiﬁed failure prob-
ability Pf̅ ,. As S t( )Intact pipe is assumed to be 1, the modiﬁed repair rate is
expressed only as a function of the existing repair rate and S t( )Damaged.
From the modiﬁed repair rate, the modiﬁed failure probability is cal-
culated by using Eq. (11). Fig. 3 compares existing failure probabilities
proposed by FEMA with modiﬁed failure probabilities. The modiﬁed
failure probability is signiﬁcantly greater than the existing failure
probability when the buried time increases from 20 to 30 years. As the
survival probability of steel pipes is more reliable than that of cast iron
pipes, the failure probability of cast iron pipes increased signiﬁcantly
with increasing time, however, the failure probability of steel pipes did
not vary substantially (see Fig. 3). Note that life expectancy of steel and
cast iron pipes utilized in the South Korea waterworks association is
approximately 30 years.
2.3.2. Other facilities
A water transmission network comprises water treatment plants,
water storage tanks, and water pumping plants. For water network fa-
cilities, the PGA is taken as the IM parameter that aﬀects structural
damage. The failure probability of facilities is modeled as a log nor-
mally distributed function, which is determined by the median and
standard deviation of the ground motion. Damage states are classiﬁed
into ﬁve states depending on performance of the structures: 1) no da-
mage state; 2) slight/minor damage state: localized damage and minor
cracks; 3) moderate damage state: malfunction of system with minor
loss; 4) extensive damage state: malfunction of system with severely
damaged; 5) complete damage state: collapsed. In this study, the da-
mage state is assumed to be an extensive damage state which implies
that the damage state is more severe than a short-term malfunction but
less than a complete collapse.
The water treatment plant puriﬁes the intake water and supplies it
to the storage tank. HAZUS-MH classiﬁed water treatment plants into
three types according to their puriﬁcation capacity: small water treat-
ment plant: 10 mgd< capacity ranging< 50 mgd, medium water
treatment plant: 50mgd< capacity ranging< 200 mgd, and large
water treatment plant: capacity ranging> 200mgd, where mgd is the
millions of gallons per day. The pumping plant increases the ﬂow
pressure to supply water from low to high areas. The pumping plant
facility comprises a small pumping plant (capacity less than 10 mgd)
and a medium/large pumping plant (capacity greater than 10mgd).
Finally, the storage tank stores the puriﬁed water supplied from the
water treatment plant and delivers the water to each household through
distribution pipelines. The storage tanks are of steel, concrete, or wood
materials, and the storage capacity is typically 0.5–2mgd. The fragility
curves of each structure can be classiﬁed as either anchored or
Fig. 2. Survival function of water transmission pipe with 600mm diameter and
500m length.
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unanchored, depending on whether it is seismically designed or a
standard design. Fig. 4 shows the failure probability of water treatment
plants, pumping plants, and storage tanks as functions of various
treatment capacities and material types.
2.3.3. Interdependent facilities
In an actual network, lifeline facilities are closely related to other
lifeline components. For example, the electric power network is sup-
plied with fuel from the gas network to operate the generator, and the
water network supplies water to the power generator facility to reduce
Fig. 3. Comparison of failure probability between existing repair rate and modiﬁed repair rate for pipelines buried for (a) 20 years, and (b) 30 years (600mm
diameter and 500m length).
Fig. 4. Failure probability of (a) water treatment plant, (b) pumping plant, and (c) storage tank.
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the gas emissions. In addition, electric power is used to operate the
pumping and water treatment plants. As all lifeline facilities have an
eﬀect on each other, the interdependency-based approach provides
more reliable results.
In this study, we consider two interdependent facilities where the
water treatment and pumping plants are supplied with electric power
from a power network. The water distribution network could suﬀer
direct destruction from ground motions, but indirect disruptions could
occur because of power supply interruptions. The failure probability of
substations is deﬁned as the extensive damage state in Fig. 5(a), and the
strength of the coupling of the two facilities can be expressed using
conditional probability. When the j-th substation is destroyed, the
failure probability of the i-th water facility can be expressed as follows:
P T S p for allinode adjacent tojnode( )iinterdep jseismic T Si j= (12)
where Sjseismic is the failure probability of the j-th substation, andTiinterdep
is the failure probability of the i-th water facilities because of inter-
dependency. The coupling strength of the two facilities are between 0
and 1, with 0 for independent coupling strength and 1 for complete
coupling strength. Fig. 5(b) and (c) show the failure probabilities of the
water treatment and pumping plants as coupling strength increases
from 0 to 1. Interdependency does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect at low
PGA, however, interdependency has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
failure probability with increasing PGA.
3. Comprehensive framework: probabilistic reliability model
In this section, we propose a comprehensive framework (probabil-
istic reliability model) that combines the methods discussed in Section
2. A comprehensive framework is critical for decision making and
management planning to design and evaluate a water transmission
network. The proposed framework will enable the prediction of system
performance against earthquakes as well as help in preparing a man-
agement plan for a stable water supply.
The probabilistic reliability model presents the performance of
network topology through a Monte Carlo simulation (MCS). An ex-
ample of evaluating a network assessment using MCS can be found in
references [23,50–53]. Fig. 6 presents a ﬂowchart of a probabilistic
reliability model implemented in this study, and the basic process of the
model is as follows:
(1) Construct the network topology based on the Graph theory to
simplify the complex water networks with junctions (node) and
links (edge). Network data include an N×N adjacency matrix, the
position of junctions, and nodes that make up the edge.
Fig. 5. Failure probability of (a) electric power substation, (b) medium water treatment plant, and (c) small pumping plant, considering eﬀect of interdependency.
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(2) Determine the location of the epicenters, focal depth, and earth-
quake magnitudes from historical data or potentially earthquake-
prone regions.
(3) Estimate the spatially correlated GMPE considering uncertainty of
the ground motion model. The GMPE should be determined as a
model that represents the characteristics of the geotechnical en-
vironment.
(4) Calculate the failure probability of deteriorated pipelines con-
sidering diameter, length, age, and materials.
(5) Calculate the failure probability of network components (water
treatment plants, pumping plants, water storage tanks, and electric
power substations) considering interdependencies between water
and electric power networks.
(6) Generate N random correlated samples between 0 and 1 using the
inverse transform sampling method [54,55], and determine the
state of the structure by comparing the i-th random number with
the structure failure probability. The component is damaged if the
random number is smaller than the failure probability calculated in
steps (4) and (5), otherwise the pipeline maintains an intact state.
(7) Depending on the state of the structure, it is stored as binary state
vectors of 0 (intact state) or 1 (damage state). From the stored
binary state vector, the modiﬁed network is reconstructed by re-
moving the link on the existing network.
(8) From the reconstructed network, check if the source node and sink
node are connected using the deep ﬁrst search algorithm [56–58].
This is also stored as binary state vectors of 0 (failure) or 1 (con-
nected). Return to step (6) and repeat steps (6)–(8) until the (i + 1)-
th random generator equals the deﬁned MCS number N.
(9) Calculate the performance indicators (CL and SR) by using the
binary state vectors calculated in step (8).
Steps (6)–(8) are performed in each MCS run, and this provides a set
of performance indicators with certain hazard levels through repeated
executions. Each set of performance indicators are calculated de-
pending on earthquake magnitude, buried time, and extent of inter-
dependency.
4. Seismic risk analysis of water transmission network
4.1. Description of water transmission network of A-city
The primary aim of this study is to obtain A-city water transmission
network data, location information of the 154 kV substations, and a
system diagram of substations supplying to water network facilities.
The source data was provided from A-city waterworks business head-
quarters, and the network data presented here shows the post proces-
sing results of the source data.
The waterworks of A-City supplies water to 1,150,215 people in an
area of 1057 km2 through 285 nodes (258 transmission nodes) and 291
edges (276 transmission edges). The total length of the edges (water
pipelines) is 151.7 km, and the pipelines diameter is greater than
600mm. Two types of material were used: steel pipes (10%), and cast
iron pipes (90%). The steel pipes were typically used for the aqueduct
pipelines, and the cast iron pipes for the transmission pipelines. The
network system comprises two water treatment plants (source), 23
storage tanks (sink), 15 pumping plants, and 10 substations that supply
electric power to the pumping and water treatment plants. The electric
power is supplied through 154 kV substations with a reduced voltage of
22.9 kV. Fig. 7 represents a number of path between sources and sinks
in water transmission network of A city. In addition, there are 7 loops in
the transmission pipeline network and 6 loops in the aqueduct pipeline
network. For more detailed information, the network map of A city is
represented in Fig. 9.
The scope of this study is to evaluate whether water supply is pos-
sible from the source to the sink. The procedure of supplying water
from the source to the sink in A-city is shown in Fig. 8. Raw water is
ﬁrst supplied to the water treatment plant through aqueduct pipelines.
Once it is puriﬁed, the water can be distributed to the storage tanks
through transmission pipelines and pumping plants. Therefore, in order
to supply water to the water storage tank, not only the pipeline but also
the water transmission network component should be operating nor-
mally. In addition, the 154 kV substations are considered to represent
the interdependency eﬀects between the water network and the electric
power network.
In this study, we evaluate the seismic reliability of the water
transmission network of A-city using the probabilistic reliability model.
The water network map of A-city is shown in Fig. 9. The epicenter was
chosen as the location of an historical earthquake of 5.8 magnitude that
was both the closest and largest earthquake occurred in A-city. Because
of security concerns, this study does not disclose speciﬁc information
about A-city. The purpose of this study is limited to identifying the
possibility of seismic risk assessment using the proposed comprehensive
framework, so the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis such as line or
area source was not considered. For the numerical example, earth-
quakes with magnitudes in the range of 5.0–7.0 were considered, and
the focal depth was assumed to be 10 km. From the results of the nu-
merical simulation, we measured the seismic risk in terms of CL and SR
with respect to various earthquake magnitudes, elapsed time, and in-
terdependency. The comprehensive framework presented in Section 3
was used for the numerical simulations.
Fig. 6. Flowchart of comprehensive framework utilized in study.
Fig. 7. Number of path between source and sink nodes.
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4.2. Results of network response
The ﬁrst case study evaluated the seismic risk assessment of the
water transmission network without considering the electric power
network. We ﬁrst considered the connectivity between the source and
sink from the earthquake, taking into consideration the eﬀects of
aqueduct and transmission pipeline degradation. To perform the nu-
merical analysis, a magnitude 5.0–7.0 earthquake was generated and
the spatially correlated PGA and PGV were calculated using the GMPE
presented in Eqs. (3)–(7). In the case of deterioration of the pipeline, we
considered the aging of water pipes to be 0–30 years using Eqs. (10) and
(11). Note that the seismic design criteria for water network systems in
South Korea is a magnitude 5.7–6.4 earthquake with a service life of the
transmission pipe of approximately 30 years.
In order to represent the vulnerability of the water system, the
fragility surfaces were plotted with respect to earthquake magnitude
and elapsed time. A total of 10,000 MCS runs were performed for each
case, and the results are presented in Figs. 10–12. In the water network
of A-city there are two source nodes and one sink node, therefore, the
fragility surfaces were classiﬁed into three scenarios: source 1-sink,
source 2-sink, and two sources-sink. Figs. 10–12 show the CL and SR
surfaces of the water transmission network with the earthquake mag-
nitude and the elapsed time after being buried. When supplying water
from source 1, most of the puriﬁed water was delivered to sinks of
magnitude 5.0 (CL ≅ 0, SR ≅ 1: no damage). Even with the magnitude
6.0 earthquake, CL and SR were measured as 0.25 and 0.75 (minor
state), respectively, however, as the magnitude of the earthquake in-
creased from 6.0 to 7.0, CL increased signiﬁcantly to 0.52 and SR de-
creased signiﬁcantly to 0.47 (moderate state). In the case of a magni-
tude 7.0 earthquake, the degradation of the pipe because of the elapsed
time had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the network system. After 20–30
years after being buried, the CL performance of the network increased
signiﬁcantly from 0.6 to 0.82, whereas the SR performance decreased
rapidly from 0.39 to 0.17 (major state).
The second scenario is the case where water is supplied from source
2. In this scenario, it is evident that the network becomes more reliable
as the water treatment plant is located farther from epicenter than in
the ﬁrst scenario. When comparing Fig. 10 with Fig. 11, it can be seen
that CL tends to decrease and SR tends to increase overall. Speciﬁcally,
when the earthquake magnitude and the time were 7.0 and 30 years,
respectively, the CL and the SR varied by 0.12 and 0.08, respectively,
which renders the state of the system more stable (major→ moderate).
The ﬁnal scenario is an evaluation of the system considering two
sources. For this scenario, the network becomes more reliable than for
the previous two cases, as two sources are considered. Fig. 12 shows a
relatively more reliable fragility surface when compared to Figs. 10 and
11. Even in cases where the earthquake magnitude was 7.0 and the time
was 30 years, the CL was smaller than 0.4 and the SR was greater than
0.6, that indicates that the system was in a minor-moderate damage
state.
4.3. Results of network response considering power network
The second case study assessed the stability of the water transmis-
sion network considering interdependency between two networks.
Based on the scenario introduced in Section 4.2, the eﬀect of the
electrical power supply was further considered. As discussed in Section
2.3.3, substations transmit electric power to water treatment and
pumping plants. Therefore, if the substation is damaged, it becomes
diﬃcult to supply the puriﬁed water to the network system. As shown
in Fig. 8, electric power is supplied from substations which are adjacent
to the water treatment and pumping plants.
Figs. 13–15 show the CL and SR surface of the water transmission
network depending on the extent of interdependence when the system
is subjected to an earthquake of magnitude 5.0–7.0. The dependency
among the components is based on the conditional probability given in
Eq. (12), that is considered to increase the strength of the coupling of 0,
0.5, and 1. The conditional probability pT Si j =0 represents the in-
dependent environment among the network components, whereas pT Si j
=1 represents the complete interdependence relationship among the
network systems. It can be seen in Figs. 13–15 that the system fragility
increases as the coupling strength increases from 0 to 1. The perfor-
mance of the water network system became less reliable with increasing
earthquake magnitude and elapsed time (discussed in Section 4.2). In
addition, as the interdependency of the network components increased,
it had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the fragility surface of the system.
Compared to the case without interdependency, the SR decreased by
approximately 0.06–0.11 (interdependency= 0.5) and 0.09–0.15 (in-
terdependency = 1), whereas the CL increased by approximately
0.05–0.1 (interdependency=0.5), and 0.08–0.14 (interdependency=
1) when the earthquake magnitude was 7.0 (see Fig. 13). In the case of
the storage tank supplied from source 2 and two sources connectivity,
the fragility surface of CL decreased and SR increased compared to the
fragility surface of Fig. 13, as the water treatment plant was located
farther from the epicenter.
5. Discussion
In the ﬁrst case study, the network response of independent systems
was considered. When the earthquake magnitude was smaller than 6.0,
Fig. 8. Water distribution systems in A-city.
Fig. 9. Representation of water transmission network of A-city using graph
theory.
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the network system exhibited a minor damage state, and the degrada-
tion of the buried pipe did not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
network performance. However, the stability of the network system
exhibited moderate state conditions as the earthquake magnitude in-
creased to 7.0. Speciﬁcally, when the earthquake magnitude was 7.0
and after 20 years of elapsed time, the CL and SR entered the major
Fig. 10. Fragility surface of independent water transmission network (source 1–sink connectivity): (a) CL, and (b) SR.
Fig. 11. Fragility surface of independent water transmission network (source 2-sink connectivity) (a) CL (b) SR.
Fig. 12. Fragility surface of independent water transmission network (two sources-sink connectivity) (a) CL (b) SR.
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damage state conditions where 80% of the storage tanks cannot be
supplied with water from water treatment plants. This is because 90%
of the A-city water network comprises cast iron pipes, and the
probability of pipe survival declines signiﬁcantly after 20–30 years (see
Fig. 2). Another reason is that the seismic criteria of the South Korean
water pipe is designed around magnitude 6.0 earthquakes, that is
Fig. 13. Fragility surface of water transmission network considering interdependency of substation (source 1-sink connectivity) (a) CL (b) SR.
Fig. 14. Fragility surface of water transmission network considering interdependency of substation (source 2-sink connectivity): (a) CL, and (b) SR.
Fig. 15. Fragility surface of water transmission network considering interdependency of substation (two sources-sink connectivity): (a) CL, and (b) SR.
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related to the length of pipelines and the corresponding PGV intensity
in Eq. (8). Therefore, it is possible to improve seismic performance
when controlling the length of the pipelines. The ﬁrst case study
showed that it is essential to consider not only the characteristic of the
epicenter (location and magnitude), but also the buried time of the
pipeline, when evaluating a water network system.
In the second case study, the network response considering electric
power substations was performed with conditional probability among
the interdependent facilities. The eﬀect of interdependency was not
signiﬁcant in earthquakes with a magnitude of 5.0 and 6.0, but the
performance of interdependent networks decreased signiﬁcantly as the
magnitude of the earthquake increased to 7.0. As the earthquake
magnitude and the elapsed time after being buried increased, the net-
work performance from the interdependency decreased signiﬁcantly.
This was because the impact of the interdependency was greater for
larger ground motions than for smaller ground motions, as shown in
Fig. 5. In summary, for an earthquake of magnitude is 7.0, the max-
imum PGA of the pipelines was approximately 0.4 g. On the other hand,
the maximum PGA of pipelines were 0.15 g and 0.08 g for earthquake
magnitudes of 6.0 and 5.0, respectively. Therefore, a numerical analysis
considering proper interdependency is required to predict the actual
damage of network systems.
6. Conclusion
This study proposed a comprehensive framework for seismic risk
assessment of urban water transmission networks. It provided guide-
lines for accurately predicting damage states to the network system
from earthquakes. In order to evaluate the seismic risk assessment of
network systems, the following issues were considered.
• A spatially correlated attenuation law was adopted for the un-
certainty of ground motion.
• The results of a survival analysis were used to consider the dete-
rioration of buried pipelines
• The interdependency eﬀect among the facilities (water treatment
plant, pumping plant, and substation) was taken into account.
• Two performance indicators (CL and SR) were measured for dif-
ferent earthquake magnitudes and elapsed times.
Results of numerical simulation shows that with increasing earth-
quake magnitude and elapsed time of pipeline, the depth of the CL
fragility surface increased, however, the SR fragility surface decreased.
Especially when the magnitude of earthquake was more than 7 and
after 20 years of elapsed time, there was a great disruption of water
supply. Furthermore, the interdependency among the electric power
substation, water treatment plant, and water pumping station has a
signiﬁcant eﬀects on water network. Even in the same earthquake
magnitude and elapsed time, as the interdependence increases, the
seismic risk of water network tends to be more vulnerable against
earthquakes.
This study investigated a number of factors that aﬀect the seismic
resilience of water transmission networks that is related to pre-earth-
quake damage predictions. In order to improve the proposed compre-
hensive framework, the post-earthquake strategies should be improved
and added to in the future. These strategies should include decision
making of repair priority of pipelines, mitigation actions by using by-
pass or alternative routes, and emergency plans for water transmission
networks. In addition, models for water distribution piping systems,
such as EPANET, can be adopted to consider the customer demand
satisfaction of urban areas, and numerous failure modes and damage
states of liquid buried pipeline can also be taken into account.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by a grant (18CTAP-C129736-02) from
Technology Advancement Research Program (TARP) Program funded
by Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT) of Korean
Government, Republic of Korea. This research was also supported by a
grant (18SCIP-B146946-01) from Construction Technology Research
Program funded by MOLIT.
References
[1] J. Kim, A. Deshmukh, M. Hastak, A framework for assessing the resilience of a
disaster debris management system, Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct. 28 (2018)
674–687.
[2] V. Cerchiello, P. Ceresa, R. Monteiro, N. Komendantova, Assessment of social vul-
nerability to seismic hazard in Nablus, Palestine, Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct. 28
(2018) 491–506.
[3] PAHO (Pan American Health Organization), Emergencies and Disasters in Drinking
Water Supply and Sewage Systems: Guidelines for Eﬀective Response, 104 Regional
oﬃce of the World Health Organization (WHO), Washington, DC, 2002.
[4] D.H. Lee, B.H. Kim, H. Lee, J.S. Kong, Seismic behavior of a buried gas pipeline
under earthquake excitations, Eng. Struct. 31 (5) (2009) 1011–1023.
[5] D.G. Yoo, D. Jung, D. Kang, J.H. Kim, K. Lansey, Seismic hazard assessment model
for urban water supply networks, J. Water Resour. Plan. Manag. 142 (2) (2015)
04015055.
[6] S.-S. Jeon, T.D. O’Rourke, Northridge earthquake eﬀects on pipelines and re-
sidential buildings, Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 95 (1) (2005) 294–318.
[7] C. Nuti, A. Rasulo, I. Vanzi, Seismic safety of network structures and infrastructures,
Struct. Infrastruct. Eng. 6 (1–2) (2010) 95–110.
[8] C. Nuti, A. Rasulo, I. Vanzi, Seismic assessment of utility systems: Application to
water, electric power and transportation networks safety, reliability and risk ana-
lysis: Theory, methods and applications, in: Proceedings of the Joint ESREL and
SRA-Europe Conference. 2009, pp. 2519–2529.
[9] C. Nuti, A. Rasulo, I. Vanzi, Seismic safety evaluation of electric power supply at
urban level, Earthq. Eng. Struct. Dyn. 36 (2) (2007) 245–263.
[10] S. Esposito, I. Iervolino, A. d'Onofrio, A. Santo, F. Cavalieri, P. Franchin,
Simulation‐based seismic risk assessment of gas distribution networks, Comput.
Aided Civ. Infrastruct. Eng. 30 (7) (2015) 508–523.
[11] K. Rokneddin, J. Ghosh, L. Dueñas-Osorio, J.E. Padgett, Bridge retroﬁt prioritisation
for ageing transportation networks subject to seismic hazards, Struct. Infrastruct.
Eng. 9 (10) (2013) 1050–1066.
[12] J. Ching, W.C. Hsu, An eﬃcient method for evaluating origin‐destination con-
nectivity reliability of real‐world lifeline, Netw., Comput. Aided Civ. Infrastruct.
Eng. 22 (8) (2007) 584–596.
[13] M. Fragiadakis, S.E. Christodoulou, Seismic reliability assessment of urban water
networks, Earthq. Eng. Struct. Dyn. 43 (3) (2014) 357–374.
[14] M. Fragiadakis, S.E. Christodoulou, D. Vamvatsikos, Reliability assessment of urban
water distribution networks under seismic loads, Water Resour. Manag. 27 (10)
(2013) 3739–3764.
[15] S. Christodoulou, M. Fragiadakis, A. Agathokleous, S. Xanthos, Urban Water
Distribution Networks: Assessing Systems Vulnerabilities, Failures, and Risks,
Butterworth-Heinemann, 2017.
[16] L. Dueñas‐Osorio, J.I. Craig, B.J. Goodno, Seismic response of critical inter-
dependent networks, Earthq. Eng. Struct. Dyn. 36 (2) (2007) 285–306.
[17] K. Poljanšek, F. Bono, E. Gutiérrez, Seismic risk assessment of interdependent cri-
tical infrastructure systems: the case of European gas and electricity networks,
Earthq. Eng. Struct. Dyn. 41 (1) (2012) 61–79.
[18] Y.-J. Lee, J. Song, P. Gardoni, H.-W. Lim, Post-hazard ﬂow capacity of bridge
transportation network considering structural deterioration of bridges, Struct.
Infrastruct. Eng. 7 (7–8) (2011) 509–521.
[19] W.-H. Kang, J. Song, P. Gardoni, Matrix-based system reliability method and ap-
plications to bridge networks, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 93 (11) (2008) 1584–1593.
[20] J. Song, W.-H. Kang, System reliability and sensitivity under statistical dependence
by matrix-based system reliability method, Struct. Saf. 31 (2) (2009) 148–156.
[21] J. Song, S.Y. Ok, Multi‐scale system reliability analysis of lifeline networks under
earthquake hazards, Earthq. Eng. Struct. Dyn. 39 (3) (2010) 259–279.
[22] H.W. Lim, J. Song, Eﬃcient risk assessment of lifeline networks under spatially
correlated ground motions using selective recursive decomposition algorithm,
Earthq. Eng. Struct. Dyn. 41 (13) (2012) 1861–1882.
[23] T. Adachi, B.R. Ellingwood, Serviceability of earthquake-damaged water systems:
eﬀects of electrical power availability and power backup systems on system vul-
nerability, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 93 (1) (2008) 78–88.
[24] S. Esposito, Systemic Seismic Risk Analysis of Gas Distribution Networks (Ph.D.
thesis), University of Naples Fegerico II, 2011 (Ph. D. Program in SeismicRisk,
Naples).
[25] N. Ambraseys, J. Douglas, S. Sarma, P. Smit, Equations for the estimation of strong
ground motions from shallow crustal earthquakes using data from Europe and the
middle East: horizontal peak ground acceleration and spectral acceleration, Bull.
Earthq. Eng. 3 (1) (2005) 1–53.
[26] N.N. Ambraseys, J. Douglas, S.K. Sarma, P.M. Smit, Equations for the estimation of
strong ground motions from shallow crustal earthquakes using data from Europe
and the middle east: vertical peak ground acceleration and spectral acceleration,
Bull. Earthq. Eng. 3 (1) (2005) 55–73.
[27] D.M. Boore, J.F. Gibbs, W.B. Joyner, J.C. Tinsley, D.J. Ponti, Estimated ground
motion from the 1994 Northridge, California, earthquake at the site of the Interstate
10 and La Cienega Boulevard bridge collapse, West Los Angeles, California, Bull.
S. Yoon et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 983–994
993
Seismol. Soc. Am. 93 (6) (2003) 2737–2751.
[28] N.A. Abrahamson, R. Youngs, A stable algorithm for regression analyses using the
random eﬀects model, Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 82 (1) (1992) 505–510.
[29] W.B. Joyner, D.M. Boore, Methods for regression analysis of strong-motion data,
Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 83 (2) (1993) 469–487.
[30] K. Goda, H.-P. Hong, Spatial correlation of peak ground motions and response
spectra, Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 98 (1) (2008) 354–365.
[31] M. Wang, T. Takada, Macrospatial correlation model of seismic ground motions,
Earthq. Spectra 21 (4) (2005) 1137–1156.
[32] K. Kawashima, K. Aizawa, K. Takahashi, Attenuation of peak ground motion and
absolute acceleration response spectra, in: Proceedings of the Eighth World
Conference on Earthquake Engineering, 1984, pp. 257–264.
[33] T. Wagener, K. Goda, M. Erdik, J. Daniell, F. Wenzel, A spatial correlation model of
peak ground acceleration and response spectra based on data of the Istanbul
earthquake rapid response and early warning system, Soil Dyn. Earthq. Eng. 85
(2016) 166–178.
[34] G.P. Cimellaro, A. De Stefano, A.M. Reinhorn, Intra-event spatial correlation of
ground motion using L'Aquila earthquake ground motion data, in: Proceedings of
the 3rd ECCOMAS Thematic Conference on Computational Methods in Structural
Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering, Corfu, Greece, 2011, pp. 3091–3108.
[35] S. Esposito, I. Iervolino, Spatial correlation of spectral acceleration in European
data, Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 102 (6) (2012) 2781–2788.
[36] V. Sokolov, F. Wenzel, W.-Y. Jean, K.-L. Wen, Uncertainty and spatial correlation of
earthquake ground motion in Taiwan, Terr. Atmos. Ocean. Sci. (2010).
[37] K. Goda, G.M. Atkinson, Probabilistic characterization of spatially correlated re-
sponse spectra for earthquakes in Japan, Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 99 (5) (2009)
3003–3020.
[38] K. Goda, G.M. Atkinson, Intraevent spatial correlation of ground-motion parameters
using SK-net data, Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 100 (6) (2010) 3055–3067.
[39] FEMA, HAZUS-MH-MR3 technical manual: In Multi-Hazard Loss Estimation
Methodology Earthquake Model, United States Department of Homeland Security,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC, 2003.
[40] ALA, Seismic Fragility Formulations for Water Systems Guideline and Appendices,
American Lifelines Alliance, Washington, DC, 2001.
[41] D.B. Ballantyne, Earthquake loss estimation modeling of the Seattle water system:
Technical Report 886005, supported by U.S. Geological Survey Project Number 14-
08-0001-G1526, Kennedy/Jenks/Chilton, 1990.
[42] G. Lanzano, F.S. de Magistris, G. Fabbrocino, E. Salzano, Seismic damage to pipe-
lines in the framework of Na-Tech risk assessment, J. Loss Prev. Proc. Ind. 33 (2015)
159–172.
[43] G. Lanzano, E. Salzano, F.S. De Magistris, G. Fabbrocino, Seismic vulnerability of
gas and liquid buried pipelines, J. Loss Prev. Proc. Ind. 28 (2014) 72–78.
[44] A. Panico, A. Basco, G. Lanzano, F. Pirozzi, F.S. de Magistris, G. Fabbrocino,
E. Salzano, Evaluating the structural priorities for the seismic vulnerability of ci-
vilian and industrial wastewater treatment plants, Saf. Sci. 97 (2017) 51–57.
[45] J. Hintz, NCSS and PASS. Number Cruncher Statistical Systems. Kaysville, Utah,
2001.
[46] D.W. Hosmer, S. Lemeshow, S. May, Applied Survival Analysis, Wiley Blackwell,
2011.
[47] S. Christodoulou, A. Deligianni, A neurofuzzy decision framework for the man-
agement of water distribution networks, Water Resour. Manag. 24 (1) (2010)
139–156.
[48] S.E. Christodoulou, Water network assessment and reliability analysis by use of
survival analysis, Water Resour. Manag. 25 (4) (2011) 1229–1238.
[49] S. Park, C.L. Choi, J.H. Kim, C.H. Bae, Evaluating the economic residual life of water
pipes using the proportional hazards model, Water Resour. Manag. 24 (12) (2010)
3195–3217.
[50] V. Latora, M. Marchiori, Vulnerability and protection of infrastructure networks,
Phys. Rev. E 71 (1) (2005) 015103.
[51] Y. Wang, S.-K. Au, Q. Fu, Seismic risk assessment and mitigation of water supply
systems, Earthq. Spectra 26 (1) (2010) 257–274.
[52] M. Javanbarg, C. Scawthorn, J. Kiyono, Y. Ono, Minimal path sets seismic reliability
evaluation of lifeline networks with link and node failures, TCLEE 2009: Lifeline
Earthq. Eng. a Multihazard Environ. (2009) 1–12.
[53] J.E. Ramirez-Marquez, D.W. Coit, A Monte-Carlo simulation approach for approx-
imating multi-state two-terminal reliability, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 87 (2) (2005)
253–264.
[54] J.E. Gentle, Random Number Generation and Monte Carlo Methods, Springer
Science & Business Media, 2006.
[55] L. Devroye, Non-Uniform Random Variate Generation, Springer-Verlag, New York,
1986.
[56] S. Even, R.E. Tarjan, Network ﬂow and testing graph connectivity, SIAM J. Comput.
4 (4) (1975) 507–518.
[57] N.P. Hummon, P. Doreian, Computational methods for social network analysis, Soc.
Netw. 12 (4) (1990) 273–288.
[58] G. Rubino, B. Tuﬃn, Rare Event Simulation Using Monte Carlo Methods, John
Wiley & Sons, 2009.
S. Yoon et al. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 31 (2018) 983–994
994
